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 Abstract 
This paper analyses the role of banks in financing SMEs in Britain and 
Germany. It applies a sociological institutionalist approach to understand how 
banks construct and manage risk, relating to SME business. The empirical 
analysis is based on the results of a comparative survey of a sample of British 
and German banks and also refers to statistical material produced by the banks 
themselves. The paper concludes that, even though bank-firm relations are still 
deeply embedded in national institutional frameworks, some tendencies towards 
convergence can also be observed, particularly among commercial banks from 
the two countries. These flow from both internationalisation and from the 
political influence of the EU. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
In diesem Papier wird die Rolle von Banken in der Finanzierung von Klein- und 
Mittelunternehmen (KMU) in Großbritannien und Deutschland untersucht. Mit 
Hilfe eines soziologisch institutionellen Ansatzes wird der Frage nachgegangen, 
wie Banken Risiken bei der Kreditvergabe an KMU konstruieren und managen. 
Die empirische Studie basiert auf Ergebnissen einer vergleichenden Befragung 
von Bankmanagern in einer Stichprobe von britischen und deutschen Banken 
sowie auf statistischen Angaben der Banken. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass 
Beziehungen zwischen Banken und KMU zwar nach wie vor in nationale insti-
tutionelle Rahmenbedingungen eingebettet sind. Zugleich führen aber Interna-
tionalisierung und politische Einflüsse der Europäischen Union auch zu einer 
partiellen Annäherung zuvor unterschiedlicher Modelle, und zwar insbesondere 
was die Praktiken kommerzieller Banken in beiden Ländern betrifft. 
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 1 Introduction
1 
Bank financing of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) recently has 
received renewed interest as a result of the ongoing internationalisation of 
financial markets for corporate finance (for the latter see Vitols 2000; Deeg and 
Lütz 2000). Additionally, the enforcement of EU competition law is set to have a 
profound impact on the German banking system. (For further details, see 
Conclusion). 
Large national and multinational companies in many industrialised countries 
are reported to be making increasing use of alternative sources of finance, such 
as stock market listing, international bond issues, and international markets for 
corporate lending which often involve transactions with financial actors other 
than just banks. Small and medium-sized enterprises, which account for very 
significant parts of economic activity and employment in the two societies, have 
only limited access to such alternative sources of finance. They therefore still 
are, and in some countries even increasingly dependent on bank lending. 
At the same time, the degree and the forms of financing of SMEs through 
banks vary significantly between countries as a reflection of different 
institutional environments in which banks and firms engage in financial 
transactions. In the literature on bank-firm relations, Germany and the UK often 
have been identified as contrasting cases. We will largely endorse this contrast 
but will also highlight a number of similarities between the two cases which are 
of recent provenance. It will be argued in this paper that a number of 
institutional features, such as company and insolvency law, the structure of the 
banking sector, as well as state policy towards the SME sector, in Germany 
have led to the emergence of rather close SME bank relationships and a 
relative high reliance by SMEs on bank lending during the post-war period. 
During the 1990s, the propensity of German SMEs to use bank finance has 
increased even further, in contrast to the practices of large German companies 
which are reducing their dependency on bank lending (Deutsche Bundesbank 
2000). 
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Last, the support and advice from Alan Hughes during the period of writing this paper has 
been much appreciated, as have been comments by Sigurt Vitols and Michael Wortmann. In Britain, the institutional environment has furthered a more arms-length 
relationship between SMEs and banks. A greater instability in the economic and 
institutional environment, a higher concentration in the banking sector, 
combined with a stronger orientation towards trade and international finance, as 
opposed to industrial and domestic finance, have historically hampered the 
development of a closer relationship between SMEs and banks. More recently, 
however, the relationship between banks and SMEs in Britain appears to have 
improved, due to a stabilisation of the economic environment, as well as to 
various initiatives from economic and political actors in favour of bank finance 
for SMEs. Even though British SMEs have diversified their financing during the 
1990s traditional bank finance still remains by far the most important source of 
external finance (see references) (Centre for Business Research 1998). 
In this article we analyse in more detail the role of banks in financing SMEs 
in Britain and Germany. We first present a sociological approach, developed in 
an earlier paper (Lane and Quack 1999), to how banks in different institutional 
contexts construct and manage risk relating to SME business. In sections three 
and four, this theoretical framework is then applied to an empirical analysis of 
bank lending, based on official statistics and a survey of a sample of German 
and British banks, conducted by an Anglo-German team of which the two 
authors are members. The results, as summarised in the conclusion, show that 
even though the relationship between banks and SMEs still is and probably will 
remain strongly embedded in national institutional frameworks it is nevertheless 
not completely sheltered from internationalisation. Nor is the relationship 
protected from the EU obligation to create a level playing field in all sectors of 
the economy. Ongoing restructuring processes of banks at the national and 
international level are likely to impact on their domestic SME financing, through 
shareholder pressures for high dividends across all segments of business 
(undermining possibilities for cross-subsidising). Shareholders’ as well as bank 
managers’ reassessment of the relative importance of different business areas 
will introduce further changes. Furthermore, decisions by the EU, undermining 
the special status and rights of savings banks within the European Union, are 
likely to have a huge and widely proliferating impact on corporatist, high-trust 
institutional settings such as the one historically evolved in Germany. 
2  Analysing Risk Handling of Banks from a Sociological 
Perspective  
Risk handling of banks, i. e. how they deal with and manage the risk involved in 
their decision-making, has been largely ignored by sociologists and left for a 
long time to be analysed by economists. Most economic theories, however, 
 
2 conceptualise decision-making of and within banks based on ‘rational actor’ 
models and mathematically inspired decision theory (for an application of these 
models to sociological theory see Coleman 1990). Economic theories assume 
not only that actors behave rationally (if not fully, then at least within the limits of 
‘bounded’ rationality). They additionally assume that a clear distinction can be 
drawn, with the help of statistical probability models, between secure and risky 
decisions about payments which will be realised only in the future. Problems of 
risk handling in banks thus have been perceived predominantly in terms of 
‘markets with imperfect information’, ‘bounded rationality of decision-makers’, 
‘moral hazard’ and ‘adverse selection’ (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). The 
individualist theoretical framework favoured by most economists, however, has 
difficulties in explaining the variation in approaches towards risk assessment 
which exists in different national environments, and within them between 
different types of organisations.  
We argue that in order to understand cross-national (and to some extent 
also cross-organisational) divergence in bank managerial practice of risk 
assessment it is necessary to consider the institutional environment in which 
these relations are embedded. This entails the regulative effects of state policy, 
legislation and intermediary organisations on risk behaviour which have been 
highlighted in comparative studies of economic organisation in different 
societies (Whitley 1999; Lane 1995; Hamilton and Biggart 1988) as well as 
normative and cognitive effects of the institutional environment on risk 
behaviour of organisations emphasised by new institutionalists in organisational 
sociology (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Zucker 1987; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). 
In our view, managerial decision-making on risk in organisations (and more 
specifically, banks) will be shaped by all three types of institutional effects – 
regulatory, normative and cognitive. A combined consideration of these factors 
is useful in order to understand possible changes in the prevalent modes of risk 
behaviour. Whereas in periods of stability, these three types of effects are likely 
to mutually support and reinforce each other, during periods of change, they 
might become dealigned and even contradictory.  
In order to apply such a perspective to the analysis of risk behaviour in 
banks we suggest to integrate recent sociological writing on risk with 
institutional and neo-institutional sociological theory emphasising the social 
embeddedness of perception and handling of risks. Sociological authors such 
as Luhmann (1993) and Baecker (1991) have argued convincingly that 
perceptions and attitudes towards risk are socially constructed (see also 
Giddens 1990). According to this view, risk is not an ‘objective’ fact out in the 
business environment which can be assessed through probability calculus but is 
continually created by bankers themselves when they make decisions in 
relation to observed risk structures and risk behaviour of potential business 
partners in their environment. Since the future is unpredictable any decision 
involves risk: it might either lead to losses, or it might entail missing valuable 
 
3 opportunities. In order to deal with this uncertainty, banks have developed into 
‘specialised second order observers’ which attempt to monitor how their 
potential business partners deal with risky decisions (Baecker 1991: 128).  
We previously have suggested (Lane and Quack 1999) that insights from 
Luhmann’s (1993) and Baecker’s (1991) work – which itself remains at a rather 
abstract level of system theory – can be fruitfully combined with the work of 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) which provides conceptual tools for the analysis 
of social variations in risk handling of banks. These authors highlight the 
influence of organisational goals on risk perceptions and the ways in which 
distinct combinations of risk aversion and risk acceptance become prevalent in 
different societies. In their work, they introduce ‘market’ and ‘hierarchy/ 
bureaucracy’ as two different broad institutional types which shape values, fears 
and attitudes towards risk. Each institutional type is associated with different 
styles of decision-making, varying manifest priorities and hidden assumptions 
and has distinct organisational limits. 
The defining characteristic of ‘hierarchy/bureaucracy’ is that all parts are 
orientated towards the whole, and collective attitudes towards responsibility, 
reward and decision-styles prevail. The attempt to preserve stability of the 
hierarchy may result in guarding against as many threats as possible by 
controlled conditions. Hence, uncertainties tend to be considered more as a 
threat rather than as an opportunity. A pessimistic world view encourages risk 
sharing. The down-side of the bureaucratic institutional type is that certain risks 
may take organisations by surprise because they are unable to spot them in 
time.  
The market-oriented institutional type supports individualistic behaviour and 
sustained profit-seeking of all kinds. The individual is acting as an entrepreneur, 
seeking to optimise at the margins of all his transactions. For this individuals 
need autonomy, particularly the rights freely to contract and freely to withdraw 
from contracts. Uncertainties tend to be regarded more as opportunities than as 
threat. An optimistic outlook favours a risk-narrowing strategy and discourages 
the sharing of gains and losses. The down-side of this system is the lack of 
concern for those who have been victims of the market.  
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) thus suggest that the values and fears of 
individuals and hence their attitudes to risk differ according to which type of 
institutions they have been persistently exposed to. Their emphasis on societal 
values is not incompatible with a focus on cognition, as suggested by neo-
institutionalists (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Values and associated decision-
making styles are seen to differ according to long-term institutional affiliation 
within societies – a view which is not far removed from the perception of 
organisational routines and cognitive schemata as shaped by historical legacies 
 
4 (see e.g. Starbruck 1976; March 1988). We suggest that the typology of 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) can be fruitfully applied to both the cross-
national comparison of attitudes towards risk and to the treatment of risk within 
societal sub-systems of different societies. Their distinction between a market-
oriented and a hierarchical institutional type can be regarded as largely 
overlapping with typifications of British ‘liberal market’ and German ‘coordinated’ 
capitalism which have been identified by authors writing in the institutional 
tradition of economic sociology (Whitley 1994, 1999; Lane 1995; Soskice and 
Hancké 1996). 
Furthermore, we believe that this typology will also be useful in analysing 
the potential impact of internationalisation on bank lending to SMEs in both 
countries. The contemporary internationalisation of financial markets has been, 
as various authors have demonstrated in more detail (Held et al. 2000), 
predominantly driven by economic actors from Anglo-Saxon countries (particu-
larly US and British banks and financial companies) to extend their economic 
space beyond their national borders. As a consequence, the institutional 
business environment of international financial markets can be considered to 
correspond to a large extent to the market-led, arms-length and short-term profit 
seeking approach inherent to Anglo-Saxon types of capitalism (Whitley 2001; 
Lane 2001; Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). Accordingly, banks originating from 
countries in which relationships between banks and companies have hitherto 
been embedded in an institutional framework of the ‘coordinated market’ type, 
such as Germany, will have to balance different and conflicting rule systems 
applied in international and national markets. For banks from Anglo-Saxon 
countries, in contrast, the rules of the international arena are likely to be 
identical or at least much closer to those shaped by the national institutional 
context. Nevertheless, the internationalisation of banks might impact on bank 
lending to SMEs in both countries due to increasing pressures for profit-
maximisation exerted by banks’ shareholders.  
3  The Institutional Context of Small Firm Lending in Britain 
and Germany 
Among the institutional features which shape bank lending to SMEs we can 
distinguish between overall societal institutions and more specific arrangements 
in the immediate environment of banks and SMEs. At the societal level, the role 
of the state in the economy, the financial system and certain aspects of the 
legal system shape economic actors’ business goals, time horizons and 
attitudes towards the future. At the level of the more immediate business 
 
5 environment, banking regulation, the structure and role of the banking system 
and the nature of the small and medium-sized firm population are likely to  
influence banks’ decision making on lending risks. 
An examination of the institutional environment of British and German 
banks (Lane and Quack 1999) revealed how macro-level societal institutions 
affected the level of uncertainty and the kinds of risks which banks in both 
countries confront in lending to small and medium-sized companies. We found 
that a more consistent and proactive policy of the German state towards the 
development of SMEs, the state's sponsorship of risk-sharing mechanisms in 
the context of pluri-lateral networks of various collective actors, together with 
the state’s more stability-enhancing management of the economy, have made 
the economic environment more predictable and SMEs a less uncertain 
customer group for banks in Germany than is the case in Britain. These factors, 
together with more stringent banking regulation, have resulted in an ex-ante 
reduction of the risks involved in bank lending to SMEs in Germany whereas the 
British institutional context saddles banks to a larger extent with risks.  
With regard to the questions addressed in this article, the more immediate 
institutional context of the bank-SME relationship deserves closer examination. 
This would help to understand which are the main banks involved in lending to 
SMEs in each country, how they are socially constructed in different ways and 
how their interactions with SMEs are shaped through regulations and 
institutionalised meaning systems.  
3.1  The banking sector 
The British banking system is highly concentrated, centralised and relatively 
homogenous. Retail banking as well as corporate banking are dominated by 
four big commercial banks whose operations are said to be strongly London 
centred. The German banking system, in contrast, has a more decentralised, 
less concentrated and more heterogeneous structure. This is mainly due to the 
relatively strong position, vis-a-vis the commercial banks, of the savings and 
cooperative banks which combine a commercial orientation with some 
consideration of the common good for their locality or members respectively. 
These banks hold considerable market shares in both retail and corporate 
banking. German saving banks and co-operative banks, according to their 
statutes, have to take into account the economic needs of their locality and the 
welfare of their members (many of which are SMEs) and to balance these 
objectives with the pursuit of profitability (Stern 1984: 151; Viehoff 1979; Deeg 
1992). To enable savings banks to serve the local community, the state has 
granted them various rights and privileges. (discussed below). Development 
banks, by definition, have to pursue policy goals such as supporting the 
 
6 development of SMEs. Thus the German banking sector includes a 
considerable number of banks which, in their pursuit of business opportunities, 
are at least to some extent governed by goals serving the common good. The 
British banking sector, in contrast, is dominated by private commercial banks 
which, due to intensified competition and a fluid market for corporate control, 
have to put the interests of their shareholders above those of other potential 
stakeholders (Parkinson 1997: 143f). 
The greater diversity within the German banking system, particularly the 
growing ascendancy within the sub-section devoted to SME lending of banks 
not exclusively ruled by considerations of profit, are reflected by data on bank 
lending to domestic firms during the period from 1990 to 1999. In Germany, 
throughout this period, the savings banks, together with their regional and 
federal bank institutions, increased their proportion of the total lending to 
companies from 30 to 37 per cent, whereas the market share of commercial 
banks fell slightly from 36 per cent in 1990 to 32 per cent in 1999. The three 
largest commercial banks, which in 1990 accounted for 15 per cent of lending to 
corporate customers, were able to increase their share to 20  per cent. The 
picture of a more decentralised and less concentrated market for bank lending 
to companies in Germany is complemented by the figures for the cooperative 
banks group (organised along similar principles as the savings banks). This 
group provided about 10  per cent, and specialised commercial and develop-
ment banks provided about 20 per cent, of lending to companies throughout the 
period (Deutsche Bundesbank 2000). 
Even though no comprehensive data are available for lending to SMEs, 
figures concerning lending to craft businesses
2 suggest that savings and 
cooperative banks occupy an even more important role in lending to these 
companies than is indicated by the overall figures. In 1991, for example, 
savings banks provided 57  per cent of the credit volume to craft business, 
followed by cooperative banks with 24 per cent and commercial banks with only 
11 per cent (Ellgering 1993). By 1999, savings banks had managed to increase 
their share of lending to craft businesses to 65 per cent. They also provide a 
considerable proportion of loans to business start ups, financing every second 
start up in 1999 (Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband (DSGV) 2000: 18). 
In contrast, the market for lending to small and medium-sized companies in 
Britain is highly concentrated. According to figures in Bank of England (1994: 
13), Natwest and Barclays held each 25  per cent of the market for SME 
business in 1990, followed by Lloyds with 20 per cent and Midland with 12 per 
cent. Thus, Natwest and Barclays as the two largest providers of finance for 
                                            
2   During the mid 1990’s, small and medium-sized firms provided 60 and 58  per cent of 
employment in Germany and the UK, respectively (DTI 1997). 
 
 
7 SME held 50 per cent and the Big Four about 80 per cent of the market for 
financing SMEs. In contrast to Germany, TSB (originating from the British 
Savings Bank group) and regional banks like Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), 
Bank of Scotland and Yorkshire Bank provided only small proportions of finance 
for SMEs. Market shares for finance to SME start ups are similarly concen-
trated. Several mergers which occurred during the late 1990s between the 
largest banks (e.g. Lloyds with TSB and Natwest with RBS) have increased 
market concentration further. When the merged NatWest/RBS began trading in 
1999, the combined figure for the largest three suppliers rose to 73 per cent 
(Cruickshank 2000). 
A further important difference between the two banking systems is the 
differing propensity of banks to provide long-term credit to companies, and more 
specifically SMEs. As Table 1 illustrates, in Germany the proportion of long-term 
lending (referring to loans granted for four and more years) to domestic 
companies increased slightly from 58.1  per cent in 1990 to 60.9  per cent in 
1999. Throughout the period long-term lending volume accounted for an above 
average proportion of the overall lending of savings banks and specialised 
credit institutions, whereas it remained below average among the commercial 
and cooperative banks. Overall, the comparison of the development of the term-
structure of lending according to bank groups highlights the important role which 
German savings banks, together with co-operative and development banks, 
play in lending – and more specifically in long-term lending – to SMEs.  
Table 1:  Long-term lending as a proportion of total lending to domestic firms in 
Germany according to bank groups, 1990-1999 
 
  Total lending to domestic firms 
(in bill. DM) 
Long-term lending as proportion 
of total lending (in %) 
  1990 1995 1999 1999 1999 1999 
Commercial banks  285,0  429,0  239,0  33.9  43.0  41.8 
Saving banks  242,3  452,9  288,3  63.6  68.4  66.2 
Cooperative  banks  84,9  137,6 80,5  43.2 45.8 46.5 
Others (incl. devel-
opment banks) 
187,0 242,5 151,9 94.8  91.1  88.8 
Total banking 
sector 
799,2 1262,0  759,7  58.1  61.7  60.9 
Note:  Long-term lending refers to loans which are granted for a duration of 4 or more years. 
Source:  Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsberichte, various issues. End of the year data. 
Historically, in Britain bank lending to small and medium-sized firms has often 
taken the form of overdraft lending which was used by the borrowers both for 
 
8 short-term liquidity and for more long-term investments. Since the beginning of 
the 1990s, however, the situation has changed considerably. Borrowing on 
overdraft has declined from 49.2  per cent of total bank lending to SMEs in 
December 1992 to only 29.8 per cent in June 1999, whereas term lending has 
increased from 50.8  per cent to 70.2  per cent during the same period (see 
Table 2). According to data in Bank of England (1995b), 42 per cent of term 
lending was for five or more years. The British Bankers’ Association reports that 
in 1997 about two thirds of the volume of term loans was for five or more years. 
Within Britain, thus, there has been a considerable change in banks' lending 
practices to SMEs which is attributed in the literature to both the increasing 
stability of the economic environment and to changing attitudes on the part of 
banks and SME customers alike. Compared to Germany, however, bank 
lending to SMEs in Britain still has a more short-term structure. 
Table 2:  Term loans as proportion of total lending to SMEs in Britain, 
1990-1999 (in %) 
 
  Dec. 1992  June 1995  June 1999 
Lending on overdraft  49.2  36.9  29.8 
Term lending  50.8  63.1  70.2 
Total lending  100.0  100.0  100.0 
(bn £)  39.54  35.90  37.2 
Source:  Bank of England, Quarterly Report on Small Business Statistics, December 1995 and 
January 2000. 
Concerning density of branch networks, statistical data support a lower density 
in Britain than in Germany. In 1995, in the UK there was, on average, one 
branch per 1,580 inhabitants, compared to one branch per 1,203 inhabitants in 
Germany. In both countries, the density of branch per inhabitants decreased 
during the following years but in 1999 it was still higher in Germany than it was 
in 1995 in Britain. As Hildebrandt (1999, 2000) has shown in a German-French 
comparison of banking, the higher density of branches in Germany is mainly 
due to the large branch network of a large number of savings and cooperative 
banks, whereas German commercial banks did not have a more dense branch 
network than their French counterpart’s (ibid). A comparison of German and 
British commercial banks indicates that, in Britain, branches of commercial 
banks have to serve a much higher number of inhabitants than in Germany, 
which again reflects the much higher concentration in the British commercial 
banking sector. In recent years, however, there has occurred a tendency of 
German commercial banks to reduce their branch networks, which is reflected 
in a narrowing gap between the two national systems, as reflected in the data 
displayed in Figure 1. 
 




























































Source:  Bank for International Settlements (1996, 2001). 
3.2  Small and medium-sized firms 
Differences in the institutional environment have generated significant variation 
in the nature of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) between the two 
countries: German SMEs are on average larger than British firms (measured in 
number of employees; ENSR 1993; Storey 1994: 20-21); they have a lower 
level of failure and lesser degree of volatility (Mullineux 1994; Midland Bank 
1994; Bank of England 1995a); their financing horizons are longer (Bank of 
England 1995b: 6), and they are more independent from larger firms (De Saint-
Louvent 1991: 55); among them is a higher proportion of craft or artisan 
(Handwerk) firms (Doran 1984; Weimer 1992); and the level of certified skills 
among owners is higher than in Britain (Midland Bank 1994). As a consequence 
of these structural differences in the SME sector, banks in both countries are 
faced with very different customer demands and hence risk decisions in 
financing SMEs. Overall, it appears that institutional factors make German 
SMEs less problematic bank customers than their British counterparts. 
The relationship between German banks and SMEs has been described as 
rather close and stable over time, reflecting among other factors a relatively 
symmetric power relationship between both partners (at least in comparison to 
other countries; De Saint-Louvent 1991). Most German SMEs traditionally have 
 
10 maintained a Hausbank-relationship with one dominant bank, although recently 
they have tended, to do business with more than one bank. German banks 
provide not only accounting services and bank lending to SMEs but have 
recently also set up special business units which offer consulting services to 
SMEs and support for medium-sized companies which aim to go public. Bank 
lending, however, still constitutes one of the core pillars of the bank-SME 
relationship in Germany, as is reflected by the increasing dependence of SMEs 
on bank lending during the 1990s. Bank borrowing which in 1987 represented 
between 28  per cent and 32  per cent of the total balance sheet of small 
companies (with an annual turnover up to 25 Mio. DM) had increased to 
between 33 per cent and 40 per cent by 1996 (Deutsche Bundesbank 2000), 
whereas the ratio of own capital had fallen among SMEs (Deutsche 
Bundesbank 1999). 
In contrast, the relationship between British banks and SMEs has been 
more problematic. It has been characterised by a higher level of discontinuity 
and change in relationships, and a higher degree of dissatisfaction with and 
mistrust in banking policies (De Saint-Louvent 1991). More recently, however, 
the relationship seems to have improved as indicated by various customer 
surveys. Some of this progress is attributable to the more stable economic 
environment in the UK compared to the ruptures of the early 1990s, which has 
allowed SMEs to reduce their net bank indebtedness and to increase their long-
term borrowing. Efforts made by banks, small businesses and small business 
representative groups have also contributed to an improvement of the bank 
SME relationship (Bank of England 1997). The importance of traditional bank 
finance (overdrafts and term loans) for SMEs has declined in recent years as 
small businesses have increasingly sought to diversify their sources of finance, 
but bank finance nevertheless remains the most important type of external 
finance for small businesses. In the period 1995-1997 it accounted for 47 per 
cent of external finance, against 61 per cent in 1987-1990. Since the largest UK 
retail banks and their subsidiaries are also the largest suppliers of other forms 
of lending, such as leasing, factoring and asset financing, their central role in 
financing SMEs has been maintained (Cruickshank 2000). 
4  Risk Handling and Risk Management in British and 
German Banks 
From the theoretical perspective suggested in section two, risks are not 
something objective existing ‘out there’ in the business environment but are 
instead socially constructed by banks themselves. In the case of small firm 
lending, this means that risks are defined by bankers in the course of their 
 
11 decision-making during the lending process. The motivations, perceptions and 
implicit rationalities which enter into this decision-making process reflect the 
institutionalised organisational rule systems of the banks in which they work. 
These organisational rule systems are shaped by the institutional context of 
their society.  
In order to gain a better understanding of the ways in which the societal 
context influences decision-making processes on small firm lending in banks we 
will discuss in this section results of our own empirical research based on 
interviews with bankers in British and German banks. The aim of this section is 
to analyse the impact of the institutional environment on risk handling strategies 
of banks. We assume that the institutional context will affect the risk handling 
strategies of banks in both countries, with respect to the degree and forms in 
which they will attempt to externalise part of the risk involved in lending to 
SMEs. Externalisation can occur through pooling it with other institutions or by 
displacing it onto individual customers. Furthermore, we expect the institutional 
environment to impact on the ways in which banks internalise the handling of 
the remaining risk involved in lending to SMEs in their decision-making 
processes on such lending, as reflected in their organisational structures, 
informal routines and rule systems. The focus in this section is thus on how 
banks as organisations construct and manage the risk involved in lending to 
SMEs in different institutional contexts.  
4.1  The survey data 
As indicated above, the banking sector and the structure of the SME population 
differ considerably between Britain and Germany. That means that there is no 
ideal research strategy for comparing ‘the incomparable’. Optimising the 
‘matching of cases’ would exclude the savings and cooperative banks (which do 
not exist in Britain) and thus lead to a rather biased view of the German system 
of lending to SMEs. Emphasising the specificities of each national system, in 
contrast, makes case based comparisons nearly impossible. In order to find a 
viable compromise our survey includes the banking groups in each country 
which provide a significant volume of loans to SMEs. The presentation of results 
for Germany will provide breakdowns for commercial compared to other banks 
as far as there are significant differences. Furthermore, we have attempted to 
differentiate as far as possible between SMEs of different size in our interviews 
with bankers. 
The following analysis is based on a sample of 12 banks (seven British and 
five German banks). In both countries, the sample includes large commercial 
banks operating nation-wide, as well as more regionally oriented banks. In 
Germany, where savings and cooperative banks provide more than half of the 
 
12 lending to SMEs, two larger savings banks and one larger cooperative bank 
operating in a region with a mixed economic structure were included in the 
sample. It is important to underline that the operations of local savings and 
cooperative banks, through close integration into their respective German-wide 
bank organization, go far beyond what an isolated regional bank could achieve. 
In Britain, the sample included five commercial banks – of which two 
subsequently merged – and two Scottish banks which, despite maintaining a 
network all over Britain, are considered to give more consideration to regional 
specificities. 
In each bank interviews with higher-level managers, usually at 
headquarters, were conducted based on a questionnaire which consisted of 
three parts: a) organisational structure, b) customers and services, and c) risk 
assessment and lending portfolio. Interviews were conducted with several 
higher middle managers responsible for the respective area of business. 
Overall, interviews lasted between two and four hours in each bank. 
Additionally, banks were asked to provide standardised data on their lending 
portfolio and information gathered for lending decisions in an advance 
questionnaire which was posted to them before the interview. Advance 
questionnaires were returned by all German, but only by three British, banks. 
The interviews in British banks took place during the summer of 1995 and those 
in German banks were conducted in the early autumn of 1996
3. 
4.2  Banks’ organisation and perceptions of small firm business 
The definition of SME customers and general perceptions which bank 
managers in our survey held of this customer group reflected the institutional 
environment and the structure of the SME population in the two countries 
outlined above. British and German banks in general distinguished between 
small, medium-sized and large corporate customers. With regard to the 
customer segment of small and medium-sized companies which is of interest 
here, it is significant that German banks on average operated with lower upper 
thresholds for both the small and the medium-sized category of business 
customers (see table  3)
4. In both countries small business customers are 
referred by banks to the ordinary services provided by the retail branches. The 
                                            
3  In Germany, additional interviews were conducted with representatives of intermediary 
organisations which play an important role in risk sharing and risk assessment. This included 
two semi-public guarantee banks and the chamber of commerce in the region in which the 
savings banks and the co-operative bank included in our sample were located. Data from 
these interviews have not been included in this paper but helped to cross-check information 
provided by the German banks. 
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4   In general, savings and cooperative banks showed a lower degree of specialisation between 
different segments and tended to concentrate on smaller companies in each segment.  size threshold after which they can expect more specialised bank services 
through customer advisors, often located in dedicated advisory centres, is 
slightly higher in Germany than in Britain. At the same time, the medium-sized 
category covers a wider spectrum of companies in Germany than in Britain. 
Differences in customer segmentation reflect the distinctive size distribution of 
firms in the two countries. They also indicate that, during the 1990s, British 
banks have been developing a stronger focus on, and have begun to invest 
more resources into, their activities for medium-sized companies, (see also 
Bank of England 1997).  





Definition of size 
Organizational unit assessing 
loan application 





Small firms  <1.6 Mio  <0.65 mio  Retail/branch 
Medium-sized 
firms 
1.6 mio – 99.2 
mio 
(1/5 – 1/130) 
0.65 mio – 70 
mio 
(1/2 – 10/500) 
Corporate advisory centres 




Corporate department in 
headquarters 
* Calculated at exchange rates of £ and DM in Sept. 2001. 
Source:  Information provided to us by British and German banks. 
It is not by chance that the two commercial banks and the large savings bank in 
Germany mentioned that in the future they wanted to focus more closely on 
medium-sized companies as the most profitable segment of SME business. For 
the two large commercial banks this implied the need for a world-wide or 
European-wide presence in this customer segment which they intended to 
achieve by reallocating resources from domestic to foreign markets, and from 
small to medium-sized business finance.  
In both countries, small firms accounted for the large majority of corporate 
customers that banks were dealing with (70 to 90  per cent) though their 
relevance in terms of overall lending volume was clearly lower (between 10 and 
55 per cent). In Britain and Germany, lending continued to constitute one of the 
core pillars of the relationship between banks and small firms. Survey banks 
generated most of their revenues in this customer category from interest 
(between 60 and 74 per cent). The revenue from commissions/fees was lower 
in their small business segment than that generated from medium–sized and 
larger corporate customers. 
 
14 Asked about major changes in the relationship between banks and small 
business during the previous five years, banks in both countries underlined the 
necessity to establish a closer contact to small firms. In Britain, this seemed to 
be a reaction to the increased readiness of small businesses to switch banks 
and to terminate lending relationships, whereas in Germany it appeared to 
reflect a tendency of small firms to deal with more than one bank (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2:  Changes in the relationship between banks and small business 
during the last five years 
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Source: Survey of German and British banks 1995/6. 
One important country difference that shaped bankers’ perceptions of their 
relationship to small firms was the divergent overall development of the banking 
sector. The British banks interviewed had, as part of the overall banking crisis in 
the early 1990s, incurred considerable losses in corporate lending, and more 
specifically in small firm lending. German banks, in contrast, reported no or only 
minor losses in corporate and small business lending during the last five years 
(if there had been losses, these referred to specific sub-sectors and were 
regarded as normal). Banks in both countries stated that their current risk 
management aimed at improving monitoring and steering of the overall risk 
portfolio in this business area, but the means which they envisaged to do that 
varied considerably, as is analysed in more detail below.  
4.3  Risk handling strategies 
Our analysis of the institutional context and secondary literature (Lane and 
Quack 1999) has suggested that banks in Britain and Germany would focus on 
 
15 distinctive risk handling strategies. British banks, operating in what, following 
Douglas and Wildavsky, can be characterised as a ‘market-type’ institutional 
setting, should tend to externalise risks as far as possible by transferring them 
to customers. In contrast, German banks, situated in a more hierarchical 
bureaucratic and coordinated institutional setting which ensures them a greater 
amount of ex ante risk reduction, should focus more on the management and 
control of internalised risk. If externalisation of risk takes place in German 
banks, it should take collectivist forms of risk sharing with intermediary 
organisations such as public loan guarantee schemes which have been in 
existence for a longer time and have a more encompassing character in 
Germany than in Britain. 
4.3.1  Externalising risk by transferring it to customers 
Externalisation of risk by transferring it to customers can occur in different 
forms: British banks are said to make little effort to appraise individual loan 
applications, and to use instead the interest rate to price for risk differentials 
(Cosh and Hughes 1994: 32). The literature also suggests that British banks 
tend to lend more often short-term and at variable interest rates than their 
German counterparts, thereby displacing risks which they incur on the 
refinancing side to their customers (Deakins and Philpott 1993: 14; Kershaw 
1996: 1; Midland Bank 1994: 9; Mullineux 1994: 2; Vitols 1997). Another form of 
transferring risk to customers is to ask for higher collateral for loans which are 
considered to involve above average risks. Whereas some studies report that 
British banks tend to take more collateral (Kaufmann and Kokalj 1989; Binks 
1991: 153; Deakins and Philpott 1993: 16), other studies did not find any 
differences in volume (Bank of England 1995a: 9; Midland Bank 1994) but 
reported that different kinds of securities were being asked for. British banks are 
said to take private property more often, whereas German banks take mainly 
business assets (Kershaw 1996: 1). 
In order to check the hypothesis that British banks are more likely than 
German banks to externalise risk by transferring it to customers, in our survey 
we followed a dual approach. We asked bankers to describe their approach 
towards handling loan applications from small businesses and the terms of 
lending applied to this customer group. In addition, they were asked to provide 
statistics on their lending portfolio which would allow us to compare the term-
structure, variability of interest rates and taking of collateral between German 
and British banks in a more detailed manner than is possible on the basis of 
official statistics. In practice, however, the data provided was often not strictly 
comparable between banks and remained incomplete since many banks 
regarded this information as confidential. The average figures provided in the 
following section should thus be considered as rough estimates rather than 
exact measures. Together with the subjective assessment of the bankers, this 
 
16 data nevertheless offers some insights into the strategies of British and German 
banks with regard to risk handling. 
Official statistics provided above (see Table 2) on the increase in recent 
years of granting term loans instead of overdrafts indicate a gradual shift in 
British banking practices (see also Young et al. 1993: 118; British Bankers 
Association (BBA) 1998; Bank of England 2000a). The trend towards more 
long-term lending in Britain is also supported by the slight rise of long-term 
lending in statistics referring to term-structure by residual maturity (BBA 1998). 
As stated above, the structure of lending of German banks is still much more 
oriented towards long-term lending than that of British banks, but the difference 
is now less stark than it has been in the past. 
Regarding the use of fixed-term interest rates the results of the survey 
confirm persisting differences. British banks in our sample granted only slightly 
more than one-tenth of their loans to business customers using fixed-term 
interest rates. German banks, in contrast, provided more than half of their 
lending to this customer category based on fixed-term interest rates. The much 
lower proportion for Britain corresponds to in Bank of England data (2000: 17) 
which indicates that in December 1996 fixed rate loans accounted for 18 per 
cent of total lending (28  per cent of term lending) of British banks to small 
businesses. Since then, small businesses in Britain have gradually increased 
their usage of fixed rate loans, which according to the same source in 
September 1999 accounted for 24 per cent of total lending (and 34 per cent of 
term lending). 
With regard to collateral, the results suggest that British banks tend to take 
collateral on lending to business customers more often than German banks. In 
lending to small companies, however, they seem to take slightly less collateral, 
which might be related to the smaller average size of loans, as well as to the 
lower availability of collateral among small firms in Britain. As suggested in 
Bank of England (1997: 13), security is becoming less important for smaller 
loans because it is not considered as cost effective by British banks. The type of 
security taken did not differ significantly between countries, with British and 
German banks taking both tangible assets and private property. British and 
German bankers, however, referred to different criteria in determining whether 
collateral should be taken or not. Whereas German bankers reported that 
security was asked for as a result of the risk analysis of the loan application 
(e.g. after intensive internal scanning of information), the answers of British 
banks suggested that they followed more a ‘hit and miss’ strategy of taking what 
is available. 
Finally, bankers were asked how they dealt with loan applications with 
apparent above average levels of risk: whether they would attempt to charge 
 
17 higher interest rates, seek higher collateral, impose extra monitoring 
requirements or use combinations of these strategies. The answers tend to 
support the above described differences: British banks stated that they would 
use higher interest rates and higher security as well as more intensive 
monitoring (if the customer paid for it). German banks showed more reluctance 
towards pricing higher risks. The savings and cooperative banks included in our 
sample rejected completely the idea of asking higher interest rates, whereas the 
two commercial banks said that they would have recourse to this strategy under 
certain conditions. Overall, pricing of above average risks was not considered 
as a feasible strategy by German banks. They considered that firstly, it normally 
would not cover fully the higher risk the bank engaged in, and secondly, due to 
the fierce competition between banks, it was difficult to impose on customers. 
(Weak companies often even ask for lower interest rates in order to recover 
from their economic problems). As a consequence, German banks tended to be 
more selective in their loan decisions, and if granting loans with above average 
risk, tended to use a combination of asking for more security and engaging in 
more intensive monitoring. 
Overall, the results provide support for the hypothesis that British banks 
tend to externalise risks more often and more extensively, and to pass them on 
to customers, than German banks do. They use variable interest rates 
significantly more often in order to protect themselves against fluctuations in 
financial markets. German banks, in contrast, grant a considerably higher 
proportion of loans with fixed-term interest rates. In individual lending decisions, 
British banks seem to be more ready than German Banks to grant loans 
involving above average risk if the customer is ready to pay for it in terms of 
higher interest rates (and to some extent also higher security). 
4.3.2  Collective forms of risk sharing 
An alternative strategy to externalise risk is to share it with other banks, with 
intermediary organisations or with the state. Risk sharing by intermediary 
organisations and the state has been, indeed, an accepted part of the post-war 
German social market economy, whereas it has not been so easily assimilated 
into the British liberal market approach (Zysman 1983; Albert 1993; Hutton 
1995). We therefore expected collective forms of risk sharing to be more widely 
used by German than by British banks.  
Empirical evidence confirms that this is the case with regard to two different 
forms of collective risk sharing. Firstly, savings and cooperative banks in 
Germany practice forms of collective risk pooling within the context of their 
banking groups. Through their regional and federal banking institutions, local 
savings and cooperative banks gain access to capital at lower interest rates and 
are shielded to some extent from the fluctuations of capital markets. Regional 
 
18 and federal savings and cooperative banks help to balance liquidity surplus and 
shortage within each of the banking groups, thus reducing liquidity risk. Local 
savings and cooperative banks can draw on their assistance in order to provide 
large loans for local customers which go beyond their individual financial 
capacity. Last but not least, local savings and cooperative banks can draw on a 
large and valuable body of information through their banking groups and central 
banking organisations (Vitols 1997). These forms of information pooling within 
banking groups do not exist in the highly competitive British banking system in 
which savings and cooperative banks have never played a significant role. 
A second form of collective risk sharing in which banks can engage in order 
to deal with above average risk in lending to small firms are Loan Guarantee 
Schemes (LGS). Such schemes do exist in both countries. Their main task is to 
provide guarantees to banks which lend money to small businesses which wish 
to finance investments with longer-term prospects but are unable to provide the 
necessary collateral. Whereas German LGS have been in operation since the 
1950s the British scheme was introduced in 1981 and has only recently gained 
momentum (Storey 1994: 226; Bannock and Partners 1995: 40, 67; Bank of 
England 1995b: 30). Since 1993, the scheme has differentiated the treatment of 
established and start-up firms, and in 1996 the maximum loan term was 
increased to 10 years (Bank of England 2000: 20). 
Hughes and Leube (1997) have undertaken a detailed analysis of the use 
made by British and German banks of Loan Guarantee Schemes. Their results 
confirm that the British scheme became more widely used during the first half of 
the 1990s. Nevertheless, in 1995 the overall number and the volume of 
guarantees, as well as the default rates of lending through these schemes, still 
differed considerably between the two countries. These variations reflect the 
different constitution of loan guarantee schemes in Britain and Germany, as well 
as differences in the use which banks in both countries make of these schemes. 
The higher number of new guarantees issued by the German loan 
guarantee schemes in 1995 indicate that the use of these schemes is rather 
common in German banks. In Britain, loan guarantees have become also more 
wide-spread but the number of new guarantees issued in 1995 was still lower 
than in Germany. Information collected in our interviews with British and 
German bankers confirms this picture. Respondents from large commercial 
banks in Germany estimated that 10-20 per cent of their overall lending to the 
corporate sector and 25 per cent of their lending to Mittelstand firms (medium-
sized enterprises) involved public guarantee schemes. The schemes were also 
reported to be widely used for larger business start-ups. In addition to the 
provision of guarantees, bankers regarded the external loan appraisal through 
public guarantee banks as one of the virtues of the loan guarantee scheme. In 
Britain, in contrast, bankers appeared to be more indifferent towards the 
 
19 operation of these schemes. This has to be seen against the background of the 
different way in which the British LGS has been set up. The German LGS were 
set up as ‘help for self-help’ organisations, with banks and insurance 
companies, as well as trade associations and Chambers of Industry and Craft 
as shareholders. The British LGS, in contrast, is a pure state scheme, 
administered by the Department of Trade and Industry (Kaufmann and Kokalj 
1989: 7-8; Bannock and Partners 1995: 40). 
Over the period from 1990 to 1995, the average volume of newly issued 
guarantees increased more strongly in Germany than in Britain, and thereby 
reinforced pre-existing differences. In 1995, the average volume of new 
guarantees issued by German loan guarantee schemes was nearly three times 
as large as that of their British counterpart. More recent data indicate a drop of 
LGS loans in terms of numbers and volume in Britain compared to a continued 
rise in Germany, as well as continuing differences between the countries 
regarding the average size of LGS loans (Bank of England 2000: 20; 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 2000). This is partly explained by the smaller 
average size of British SMEs and the smaller average amount of lending of 
British banks to SMEs. Another important factor, however, is the specific use 
that German banks make of loan guarantee schemes. Risk sharing in the 
context of these schemes is used predominantly for investment projects of 
medium-sized enterprises and larger business start-ups. Most of the German 
banks stated in the interviews that the amount of work necessary for the 
application and the duration of the decision-making procedure in order to obtain 
a public loan guarantee made them ineffective if applied to small firms and 
small business start-ups. This view was particularly pronounced among the 
savings and cooperative banks which deal more often with smaller firms. As a 
consequence, respondents of savings and cooperative banks reported much 
lower proportions of their lending to be supported by loan guarantee schemes 
than the large commercial banks (estimated as below 1 or 2 per cent of total 
lending to the corporate sector).  
One explanation for the lower popularity of LGS among British banks is that 
default rates of lending secured through Loan Guarantee Schemes have been 
relatively high. Reforms of the scheme have been able to reduce the default 
rate in Britain during the first half of the 1990s whereas in Germany it increased 
slightly following the extension of the system to East Germany. In 1995, 
however, the default rate in Britain was still 13.7  per cent compared to only 
2.2 per cent in Germany. This can be explained by the fact that in Germany, 
default risks are shared between the bank which grants the loan and the Loan 
Guarantee Scheme, and banks therefore have an interest in a rather intensive 
screening of such loan applications. In Britain, in contrast, the bank granting the 
loan does not carry default risks but displaces them to the state. An additional 
explanation, however, must be sought in the type of firm supported, with British 
LGSs being more likely than German ones to support high-risk start-up firms. 
 
20 In sum, the evidence presented in this section confirms that German banks 
do make more frequent use of collective risk sharing, both within certain 
banking groups (i.e. the savings and cooperative banks) and between banks 
and intermediary institutions such as the loan guarantee schemes. Recent 
attempts to establish schemes of collective risk sharing for lending to small 
firms in Britain have not been equally successful. This has been often attributed 
to the state-led character of the British schemes. Our results, however, suggest 
that another reason for the limited success of British LGS might be their focus 
on relatively small-scale lending to relatively small firms – a market segment in 
which the ‘transaction costs’ involved in collective risk sharing have made 
German banks equally reluctant to use such schemes. 
4.3.3  Internalising risk: selecting risk in lending decisions  
Sociological approaches towards risk in bank lending underline that risk is not 
on objective fact, but is actively selected and constructed by bankers in the 
course of their decision-making on lending applications. One important strategy 
of risk control refers to the use of information designed to reduce the 
unpredictability and variability of outcomes. Equally, the information searched 
for and the way in which it is processed within banks is not a matter of objective 
facts. Instead, each bank develops its own internal screening system, in which 
different categories are selected or similar categories prioritised to different 
degrees. Banks will then deploy the information thus obtained as a base for 
decision-making on lending (Baecker 1991). 
Our previous analysis of the institutional environment in both countries 
(Lane and Quack 1999) led us to expect that the sources of information used 
and the processes applied to the selection of risk in lending decisions would 
display specific country patterns, beyond any variation between individual 
banks. In particular, we assumed that the existence of a pluri-lateral network of 
intermediary organisations, and the ensuing greater availability of information 
on SMEs, would enable German banks to assemble a larger and more varied 
amount of information, particularly from external sources, than their British 
counterparts. Existence of legal obligations to reveal existing debts in Germany 
provide banks with an additional source of information, not available in Britain. 
Furthermore, the existing literature suggested that British banks use the past 
financial performance of firms as a signal of credit worthiness. German banks, 
in contrast, are reputed to consider in addition more qualitative and future-
oriented aspects of the loan application (Deakins and Philpott 1993; Wood et al. 
1992).  
In our interviews we asked banks which sources of information, criteria for 
credit-worthiness and decision-rules they used in the assessment of loan 
applications from small business customers. The results indicate that banks in 
 
21 both countries used rather similar sources of information but made different use 
of them. Interesting differences appeared between different banking groups in 
Germany. 
As Figure 3 indicates, the principal sources of information used by German 
and British banks and the relative importance accorded to them in terms of 
providing background information, were quite similar. Banks in both countries 
considered company reports and accounts, information provided by the loan 
applicant and internal data bases as very important or of highest importance. 
The higher importance accorded by British banks to commercial databases 
reflects the Anglo-Saxon market-led approach of externalising risk assessment 
to specialised private companies and professionals (e.g. rating agencies, 
accountants). Instead, German banks in our sample gave slightly more 
emphasis – even though at a low level – to intermediary organisations (cham-
bers of commerce, industry and trade associations) as principal sources of 
information, which again reflects the specific institutional environment. 
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Source:  Survey of German and British banks 1995/6. 
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The influence of the institutional environment on banks’ sources of information 
on small business, however, should not be overrated. Even though German 
banks can scan a wider range of information sources on small business 
customers than British banks, the key sources which they use in assessing loan 
applications are basically the same as in British banks. Banks in both countries 
reported reliance mainly on company reports and accounts, information 
provided by the applicant and internal data bases – in Britain complemented by 
external commercial data bases. There are, however, as Figure  4 indicates, significant differences between German savings- and cooperative banks and 
German commercial banks. Whereas the first included also information from 
other sources such as intermediate organisations, German commercial banks – 
like British banks – accorded no or only little importance to these additional 
sources of information. In this respect, saving and cooperative banks seem to 
be more strongly inserted into pluri-lateral networks than their commercial 
competitors. 
Figure 4:  Specific sources of information used by banks to assess loan 
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Source:  Survey of German and British banks, 1995/6. 
A further difference in the process of information procurement between the two 
national banking systems is the quality of information obtained from the main 
sources listed above. This is particularly the case with regard to the information 
which banks can obtain from loan applicants themselves. In Germany, 
enterprises exceeding a loan limit of DM 250,000 (around £ 83,000 at the 
exchange rate of September 2001) are required by law to reveal full information 
on their economic situation to the bank from which they aim to obtain the loan
5. 
In Britain no equivalent regulation exists. Furthermore, the ‘Hausbank’ 
relationship in Germany also facilitates information gathering of German banks 
compared to the more transaction oriented business relationship between 
British banks and their customers. German bankers, for example, mentioned in 
the interviews that as part of the loan application they would require and obtain 
more up-to-date financial and planning data from applicants than contained in 
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5  As one of our respondents indicated, fierce competition in the banking sector renders it 
sometimes difficult for banks to enforce these requirements on small business customers 
(see also Güde 1995). annual reports. This information was rated as highly important by German 
respondents whereas the use of such data was not particularly emphasised by 
British bankers.  
Additionally, bankers were asked to give a detailed description of the 
decision-making rules applied in assessing loan applications. The answers tend 
to confirm the well-known contrast between the orientation of British banks to 
consider mainly the financial situation of the applicant or his/her business, with 
a strong bias towards historical data. This is in contrast to German banks' 
greater emphasis on managerial qualities and the future prospects of the 
applicant's project or business. Three of the four British banks which responded 
to this question listed predominantly financial indicators (such as account 
performance, cash position, personal credit references, forward orders, etc.). 
Only one bank explicitly included sector risk and management quality as a 
weighted factor in the assessment (the former being accorded 25-30 per cent, 
the latter about 30 percent, compared to financials with 25 and projected 
financials with 15 per cent). Two other banks stated – when asked for – that 
they would also look at the quality of management and make use of site visits. 
Overall, however, the assessment of the latter was considered as subjective 
and unreliable. 
Respondents in German banks stated that information relating to the 
financial situation of the applicant’s business would carry a weight of between 
approximately 30 and 50  per cent, confirming the high importance given to 
company reports and balance sheets as sources of information. In addition, 
quality of management was listed by all German bankers as an important item 
to be included (with a weighting of between approximately 10 to 33 per cent, 
depending on the bank). In contrast to the British banks, the assessment of this 
factor was not regarded as particularly problematic by German interview 
partners. On the contrary, a certain subjective component was even considered 
necessary and desirable. Furthermore, most of the loan assessment schemes 
applied in the German banks included a future oriented component, either 
based on the prospects of the individual company investment project and/or on 
the projected development of the industry or economic sector (with a weighting 
between approximately 20 and 33 per cent). 
In general, German bankers favoured case-based over class-based 
decision-making in lending to small business customers. This was reflected in 
their negative attitude towards the automation of lending decisions in this 
customer segment – an attitude which was found in only one of the British 
banks included in the survey. German bankers considered computer-based 
loan assessment as useful in order to steer and control the risk portfolio, and 
they also welcomed the standardising effect on the processing of loan 
application, but they did not consider computer-based decision-making as very 
 
24 useful when applied to individual cases. One of the German bankers even 
stated that their experience with different computer-based loan assessment 
schemes during the last ten years showed that the statistical methods used in 
these programs still produced more defaults than they had actually in their 
books. The preferences for case-based versus class-based approaches to risk 
assessment, as displayed in the answers of the German and British 
respondents respectively, might however, not do full justice to the actual 
situation found in banks of both countries. It has to be kept in mind that German 
commercial banks have separated out very small firms, to be dealt with in the 
retail branches. When the German interviewees rejected automation of lending 
decisions, they were likely to have in mind a more medium-sized firm whereas 
for their British counterparts small firms would have been the main reference 
group. 
In sum, commercial banks in the two countries are using similar information 
in assessing loan applications, whereas the numerically dominant German 
savings and cooperative banks differed somewhat from their commercial 
competitors in the type of information consulted. But German and British banks 
make different use of it. As far as scanning the environment for information is 
concerned, German savings and cooperative banks appear to be embedded 
more deeply into the institutional environment than German commercial banks. 
The indicators of credit worthiness which banks extract from their sources of 
information as well as the decision-making rules applied to loan applications, 
however, show greater homogeneity within than across countries. German 
banks tend to use a more case-based approach orientated towards the quality 
of management and the future potential of the firm compared to British banks 
which rely on a class-based approach with strong focus on the financial 
situation and past development of SMEs. Even if future prospects of small firms 
have recently been given more weight by British banks, as suggested by Bank 
of England (1997), the focus rests on financial indicators, such as business 
intentions and cash flow. 
4.3.4  Managing the internalisation of risk 
Following sociological approaches, managing lending risks basically means 
managing the decision-making process over lending, since that is where risks 
are constructed and selected by banks. Since the literature suggests that 
German banks tend to internalise more risks than British banks, we would 
expect them also to devote more organisational resources to bureaucratic 
methods of standardising procedures and creating uniformity in decision-making 
than do British banks. Following the market-based institutional type of Douglas 
and Wildavsky’s typology, British banks should instead operate more on the 
basis of an internal market model, with lending managers acting as ‘quasi-
entrepreneurs’ whose decision-making should not be hampered by too much 
 
25 bureaucracy. This should result in a greater variety in the mode and outcome of 
decision-making on risks in British than in German banks. In our survey, we 
included questions concerning the banks’ organisational structure and 
processes relating to the small business sector, as well as job descriptions and 
qualification profiles of the staff dealing with SME customers, in order to 
ascertain empirical evidence relating to the above mentioned issues. 
The evidence collected for German banks suggests a gradual departure 
from what Baecker (1991: 151ff.) described as the traditional ‘niche strategy of 
risk management’. According to this strategy, banks attempt to absorb the 
insecurities involved in their decision-making through specialisation of their 
organisational structures and processes (see also Knight 1921). This implies a 
bureaucratisation of the decision-making process through a separation between 
customer acquisition and credit control, and standardised methods of 
assessment, double checking and a system of cascading discretion limits in 
decision-making on loan applications. Furthermore, a separation of customer 
acquisition from credit control leads to sequential decision-making. As a result 
of these two procedures, the overall risk involved in a decision is transformed 
into partial risks dealt with by different organisational units or different 
hierarchical levels. Bureaucratic methods of standardisation tend to take the 
consideration of risk out of day-to-day routines since decision-making is 
prescribed by rules which leave little discretion about risk taking to the individual 
staff. 
In contrast to the findings of studies conducted before ours (Quack and 
Hildebrandt 1997, 1999), a number of German banks in our sample reported 
that they had given up the strict division between customer acquisition and 
credit control in order to increase speed and efficiency of their decision-making. 
Two commercial banks and one savings bank had recently introduced teams 
consisting of relationship managers, credit officers and other specialised staff 
dealing with a group of specific SME customers. Two banks (one commercial 
and one savings bank) emphasised that, in order to increase efficiency and 
speed of decision-making, they were reducing the number of the hierarchical 
levels involved in the decision-making process. Applications would be 
immediately forwarded to the level of the hierarchy responsible for the 
respective size of lending, while intermediate levels of the hierarchy would be 
informed only after the decision had been taken. These banks, thus, were 
attempting to re-integrate decision-making on lending to SMEs, or at least to 
reduce the degree of sequential decision-making. The other savings bank and 
the cooperative bank in our sample were still operating the classical division 
between customer acquisition and credit control, as well as hierarchical systems 
of discretion limits. They did not intend to change these. 
 
26 Three of the German banks in our sample reported that the SME 
relationship manager (or the branch manager) would decide alone on lending 
applications up to a certain limit. This was specified as up to DM 250,000 - 
500,000, depending on the seniority of the manager as well as the banks’ 
decision-rules
6. In general, commercial banks tended to grant higher discretion 
limits to individual managers than savings and cooperative banks. German 
commercial banks, thus, are more prepared to follow ‘market principles’ than 
savings and cooperative banks with their different constitution. 
But even German banks which had reduced the incidence of sequential 
decision-making by introducing teams still kept a relatively strong focus on 
standardisation of decision-making. The main instrument to achieve this 
standardisation was computer-based expert systems for rating loan applica-
tions. These systems standardised the collection and weighting of the informa-
tion relevant for the loan application and defined ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ areas 
of decision-making. The final decision, however, was still taken by the 
relationship manager. Standardisation of decision-making itself was, according 
to the German respondents, achieved through previous training and work 
experience (particularly as credit officer)
7. Variations in assessment, if at all, 
would occur only with regard to the evaluation of the management of the 
company in question. Some bankers also referred to existing written guidelines 
on lending, but compared to the practical application of the rating systems they 
seemed to be of less importance.  
Four of five German banks stated that they were satisfied with the degree 
of standardisation reached, and most of them explained that it was more a 
matter of steering the risk portfolio than achieving complete standardisation, 
which was considered as not possible. Surprisingly, when asked, only two 
banks reported that they had or were planning to introduce procedures which 
would control whether standardisation had been achieved or not
8.  
                                            
6   The Mittelstand unit of the other large commercial bank represented an exception in the 
sense that loan applications were always decided upon collectively by the newly established 
team of relationship manager and credit officer, but it has to be taken into consideration that 
the upper limits for lending were much higher in this case (up to DM 500 million). 
7   Outside the ,positive area‘ identified by the expert system, the relationship managers‘ 
decision-making was again controlled through double checking and hierarchies: At least one 




8   In one case, this was achieved through an analysis of default risk down to the level of the 
branch which then had to attempt to identify the source of ‘wrong’ decision-making. One 
other bank was planning to introduce such a system in the future in order to provide 
relationship managers with a better knowledge about their risk position and the diversifica-
tion of risks. Three banks did not mention any method to control for standardisation, with one 
big commercial bank explicitly arguing that they did not need such a control. In contrast to the German model, decision-making in British banks has 
been described in the literature as individualised and more idiosyncratic 
(Deakins and Hussain 1991; Hutchinson and McKillop 1992). The – relatively 
vague – answers of our British interview partners suggest that like in Germany, 
the relationship manager is responsible for decision-making on lending within 
the limits of his/her discretion
9. Two commercial banks specified the discretion 
limits of business relationship managers/branch managers as up to 
approximately £ 40-50,000. Beyond these limits, applications would be referred 
either to managers at higher levels of the business unit, to the commercial/ 
corporate lending unit, or to a regional credit control unit. Thus, in terms of 
discretion limits for relationship managers at the local level, British banks did not 
appear to differ significantly from German banks. 
As far as standardisation is concerned, this seemed to be of less concern to 
British than to German banks
10. One British bank states that standardisation 
was supposed to come from the training side (including internal and CIB training 
courses, as well as the ‘apprenticeship’ as relationship manager’s assistant), 
and another bank used a computer-based scoring system to assess loan-
applications above a certain size and assessed the lending of branches every 
second year. Three banks mentioned the aim to standardise decision-making 
as one of the reasons for their plans to install computer-based scoring and 
rating systems in the near future (other reasons given were to reduce costs; 
there were contrasting opinions as to whether these systems would increase 
the quality of risk analysis as such). As far as there were attempts to 
standardise decision-making in British banks, they referred to the introduction of 
computerised rating and scoring systems which assessed loan applications 
based on class-based probability calculations. 
If not through bureaucratic standardisation, decision-making on lending in 
British banks might be managed and controlled through other mechanisms 
translating overall business goals into decision-making at the individual level. 
Performance related pay systems, for example, can be regarded as a method to 
steer the behaviour and decision-making of staff according to banks’ business 
goals. Our results on performance related pay, however, do not support the 
claim that British banks are more strongly oriented towards the introduction of 
market principles and German banks are more prone to preserve security. Nor 
do the results suggest that British bankers have more individual leeway and are 
more steered through profit-making than German bankers. In Britain, all banks 
                                            
9   Only one Scottish bank had just moved from this model to a centralisation of decision-
making by sanctioners based in regional offices. This case resembled the ,niche concept‘ 
since the relationship manager would prepare the loan application and forward it with his or 
her recommendation to the sanctioner who would take the decision. 
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10    One British bank even stated that they had no form for loan applications and used the 
business plan as basis for their assessment. had performance related pay systems for relationship managers which 
accounted for between five and 20 per cent of the overall income. In Germany, 
three out of five banks had performance related pay systems for relationship 
managers which accounted for between five and 25  per cent of the overall 
income. Due to limitations through the existing collective agreement, the two 
saving banks in our sample did not operate such systems but intended to 
introduce a performance related pay component in the near future. Among 
commercial banks, there were no clear differences in the criteria on which 
performance related pay was based. In both countries, banks listed volume and 
profits attained from lending most frequently, followed by the quality of the 
lending (e.g. risks involved) and listing organisational, staffing and community 
issues last.  
Overall, banks in both countries still seem to operate rather bureaucratic 
systems of hierarchical decision-making on lending to SMEs within which 
performance related pay systems are only subordinate instruments to steer 
decision-making. Nevertheless, the survey revealed pronounced differences 
with regard to the degree of standardisation and of sequential decision-making. 
German banks tended to invest more resources in order to achieve 
standardisation, and they were still more prone to subdivide decision-making 
into different steps, or at least to involve people with different qualifications and 
backgrounds in the decision-making than their British counterparts. Recently, 
differences within the German system appear to have become more significant, 
with commercial banks being quicker to embrace the new ‘market’ principles 
than savings banks and, to a lesser extent, cooperative banks. These constrain 
managers to link pay to performance, and exert pressure on organisations to 
depart from sequential and bureaucratic to more integrated decision-making 
procedures.  
5  Discussion and conclusion 
Our analysis started from the assumption that in order to understand cross-
societal differences in bank lending to SMEs we have to analyse how the 
institutional environment shapes the way in which banks construct and manage 
risk. We suggested a theoretical framework combining institutional and neo-
institutional approaches which would allow us to include regulatory, normative 
and cognitive effects in our analysis. Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) ‘market’ 
and ‘hierarchy’ institutional types were chosen as appropriate typifications for a 
cross-national comparison of banks strategies and practices towards risk in 
lending to SMEs in Britain and Germany. Our interest, however, was not only to 
analyse similarities and differences between the two countries, but also to 
 
29 identify ongoing changes which could be related to the increasing internation-
alisation of banks in both countries. 
Differences between a market-led, individualist approach and a hierarchi-
cal, collectivist approach towards risk taking and management are most clearly 
visible in British banks’ greater propensity to externalise risk by transferring it to 
customers, compared to German banks’ greater readiness to collective risk 
sharing. In both cases, banks’ strategies remain closely related to the existing 
institutional environment in each country. But the empirical analysis indicates 
that, for each country, gradual changes in the institutional context and in 
banking practices occurred in parallel. 
In Britain, the economic, social and political situation throughout the 1990s 
generated a climate that was more attentive to financing of SMEs, and within 
this context forms of collective risk sharing, such as the Loan Guarantee 
Scheme, could be established and consolidated on a limited scale. Since the 
overall institutional context is still characterised by market-led and arms' length 
relationships, collective risk sharing strategies cannot gain more than a niche 
status in the British context. Our results show that the reasons for their limited 
reach might not only lie in their state-led character and the indifference of 
commercial banks in Britain. The British scheme focuses mainly on smaller 
loans for which collective risk sharing is not regarded as an attractive or cost 
effective strategy by German banks either. 
In Germany, increasing internationalisation has led commercial banks, and 
to a lesser extent savings and cooperative banks, to reassess their services to 
small firms in terms of cost effectiveness. It has, however, not undermined their 
willingness to use collective risk sharing for larger SMEs and business start-
ups, nor does it seem to have led to an increasing externalisation of risks by 
passing them to customers so far. This partly is related to the fact that within the 
German market there is fierce competition between commercial, savings and 
cooperative banks for the custom of SMEs, which are considered to be a 
lucrative customer group. This is also highlighted by the fact that the aim of 
large German commercial banks is to achieve a leading position in the SME 
market throughout Europe.  
Regarding banks’ strategies to select and manage risks in lending to SMEs, 
the results do not fully correspond to our original hypotheses of a market-led, 
individualistic approach in Britain versus a hierarchical-collectivist approach in 
Germany. In both countries, organizational structures and routines of the SME 
business (as that of retail banking in general) are still modelled along classical 
bureaucratic principles. Within this bureaucratic model, however, the results 
show clear country differences which appear to be reformed but not 
fundamentally changed under the pressures of internationalisation. 
 
30 British banks follow a portfolio-led approach towards risk which favours 
class-based assessment of individual loan applications and uses mainly 
standardised, quantitative information such as company reports, account 
information and cash flow analysis. The downside of this approach is that 
qualitative indicators, relating to management skills and prospects of future 
projects, become regarded as subjective and unreliable, and are not 
systematically included in the risk assessment. Given the strong pressures for 
profit performance which financial markets exert on British banks, it is 
surprising, however, how little attention was given by the British bankers we 
interviewed to efforts to standardise risk assessment in their banks. 
German banks, in contrast, tend to follow a case-based approach towards 
risk evaluation in lending to SMEs which encompassed quantitative and 
qualitative indicators of credit worthiness and included also future-oriented 
variables. There are some indications that internationalisation of German 
commercial banks might drive them closer towards the portfolio approach of 
their British counterparts. Thus our results suggest that, as part of overall 
restructuring programmes, management hierarchies in lending to SMEs are 
becoming ‘leaner’ and ‘slimmer’, that the high degree of sequential decision-
making is being reduced and that performance-related pay systems are being 
introduced. These developments become even more significant when seen in 
the context of the future changes which the top management of Deutsche Bank 
as the sectoral leader, envisage. Thus, German banks attempt to compensate 
for their more qualitative and subjective evaluation of individual borrowers with a 
highly standardised procedure to deal with risk. British bankers, in contrast, 
adopt a more quantitative approach to loan assessment while giving less 
attention to a standardised evaluation of risk. 
The results of our analysis indicate an increasing differentiation among 
German banks in terms of business strategies and approaches towards lending 
to SMEs between commercial banks, on the one hand, and savings and 
cooperative banks,on the other hand. The commercial banks seem to have 
embraced more rapidly a market-driven approach which is reflected by a 
concentration on lucrative sub-segments of the SME market, a reduction of their 
branch networks, flatter organizational hierarchies and performance-related pay 
systems. Savings and cooperative banks, in contrast, continue to serve also the 
lower segments of the SME market, remain embedded in the institutional 
networks of their locality, maintain most of their organizational and decision-
making structures, and are more reluctant to adopt (or are institutionally limited 
in their use of) performance-related pay systems. 
Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s competition for customers drove 
commercial banks to establish services for SMEs which resembled those of 
their competitors, the savings and cooperative banks, the internationalisation in 
 
31 the 1990s appears to have had the opposite effect. The gradual change in 
business strategies of commercial banks does not necessarily have to result in 
negative effects on the availability and conditions of SME finance in Germany. 
As we have seen in section 3, the specificities of the German banking sector 
are based to a large extent on the institutional framework under which savings 
and cooperative banks fulfil their task. These banks, because of their larger 
market share for SME financing, continue to shape outcomes for SMEs.  
Threats to the German type of financing SMEs, thus, do not only or even 
mainly originate from market-led gradual realignments in the overall business 
strategies of large commercial banks. They also derive from the EU 
Commission's decision (taken in July 2001) to impose considerable changes in 
regulation and organisation of savings banks and their regional Landesbanken. 
According to this decision, the assumption of liability by the banks' (state) 
guarantor (Gewährträgerhaftung) – which prevents the occurrence of 
bankruptcy by public institutions – shall be abolished, and the provision 
ensuring the supply of sufficient capital by the state (Anstaltslast) will have to be 
adapted to EU competition standards within a transitional period of four years. 
An end of state liability would mean that banks no longer have access to credit 
below market rates. These changes in regulation signify a considerable 
transformation of institutional features which previously had allowed savings 
banks to play a central role in the financing of SMEs. Many savings banks are 
likely to change their status to that of limited liability company. Hence, mergers 
with/take-overs by commercial banks, heralding stronger concentration within 
the banking sector, are predicted, as is a radical reduction of the branch 
network (Financial Times Deutschland, 18.7.2001). 
It remains to be seen how these changes will impact on the role, vis-a-vis 
SMEs, this important segment of the German banking sector will be able to play 
in future. Predictions of radical change (Financial Times Deutschland, 
18.7.2001) contrast with cautious optimism from within the savings banks 
system (Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband 2001b). The latter promised 
not to change its philosophy of steering a course 'between competition and 
orientation to the common good' (ibid), and far-reaching organisational reforms 
and changes in business foci are envisaged to maintain the competitiveness of 
the savings banks group (Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband 2001a).  
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